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Can the New Intergovernmental Structure Work in Pakistan 
in the Presence of Governance Challenges? Learning From 
China 
Ehtisham Ahmad*  
1. Introduction 
The 18th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan 
disentangles overlapping spending responsibilities between the federation 
and provinces in a wide range of functions, devolving them to the latter. 
The legislation was also a reaction to relatively poor service delivery and 
living standards that had fallen continuously behind those in other 
countries in South Asia, and, indeed, are now lower than sub-Saharan 
Africa in most respects.  
The Musharraf government had used this argument for its own 
decentralization effort—delegating power to the districts and bypassing 
the political centers of power in the provinces. The 18th Amendment 
reasserts the provinces’ power and the associated political centers of 
power. It is designed to weaken the center, and correspondingly make it 
less attractive for the military to assume power by moving against an 
elected Prime Minister, as it has done periodically in Pakistan’s history. 
But will this major reform work effectively and ensure higher living 
standards for all people in all the provinces? To what extent is the need for 
a national identity important in ensuring that the decentralization does not 
cause the federation to unravel or the overall delivery of public services to 
deteriorate and lead to greater exclusion of the poor? These are important 
issues and could well determine the fate of the 18th Amendment as well as 
social stability in Pakistan. 
Section 2 outlines developments in theory linking governance and 
the decentralization process. The links between the two are critical.1 The 
                                                     
* The author is Senior Fellow, Center for Development Research, University of Bonn, and Asia 
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main question is whether decentralized service provision can better 
provide for the poorer sections of society by utilizing information that may 
be available at the local level in tailoring services to local preferences and 
making access easier. How are these responsibilities financed? Does the 
process impede closer economic integration between the federating 
provinces? We argue that positive approaches to intergovernmental 
reforms, as exemplified by the People’s Republic of China, are perhaps 
more important for countries such as Pakistan that face significant 
structural challenges. 
Section 3 focuses on the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) 
Award and key elements of the 18th Amendment. Their components are 
examined in relation to the main criteria for good governance, utilizing 
positive approaches to institutional and multilevel governance reforms. We 
argue that the failure of tax reforms poses serious difficulties both for the 
NFC and the stability of assignments arising from the 18th Amendment. 
These accentuate the danger of Pakistan becoming a “failed state”, 
highlighted by commentators prior to the NFC award or the 18th 
Amendment (see Haque, 2009). 
In order to prevent dire consequences arising from the NFC award 
and the 18th Amendment in the presence of failed tax reforms and opaque 
governance, Section 4 outlines an agenda for urgent action that revisits 
archaic and inefficient revenue assignments dating back to the Government 
of India Act 1935. We conclude with some proposals that might be 
considered in the context of the next NFC award, and possibilities for 
another constitutional amendment on the revenue side to parallel that on 
the spending side. Joint action on tax policy and assignments, as well as the 
complete overhaul of the country’s tax administration framework are 
needed. 
2. Normative or Positive approaches to Federalism and 
Decentralization?2  
In this section, we set the stage by reviewing the normative and 
positive approaches to decentralization, and examining theory and 
                                                                                                                                    
1 See Burki and Perry (2000). See also Shah (2010), who also draws attention to the very important 
lessons that can be drawn from the Chinese experience. 
2 This section draws on Ahmad (2010a) and Ahmad and Brosio (2006). 
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evidence, including the example of China. We also draw some lessons 
regarding preconditions for good governance in a decentralized 
framework, and link this to the Pakistan context in the subsequent sections. 
2.1. Developments in Theory 
The post-Second World War normative literature on fiscal 
decentralization has been much influenced by the experience of the US, 
and the work inter alia of Musgrave (1959) and Olson (1968). These were 
based on the assumption that governments are benevolent. This reflected 
the views of Montesquieu, and of Hamilton and Madison in the Federalist 
Papers, that a government should be small and its functions separated, 
with the center responsible for issues that affect all lower levels of 
government, such as defense and monetary policy. The assumption has 
been, particularly on the part of some bilateral and multilateral agencies, 
that decentralization leads to more efficient service delivery, higher 
growth, and poverty reduction. 
Experiences outside the US, particularly in the European Union 
(EU) and especially in developing countries, have led critics to question the 
normative approach, spawning a surge in the “political economy” 
literature (see surveys in Ahmad & Brosio, 2006; Oates, 2008; Lockwood, 
2009). This reflects an earlier debate associated with De Tocqueville and 
John Stuart Mill, which focused on the actual workings of government and 
an evaluation of the pros and cons of “decentralized” operations. The main 
difference is that the assumption of “benevolent” government is dropped, 
and incentives facing politicians and bureaucrats become important as 
does the role of institutions and information flows.  
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) write about the possibility of 
“capture” by vested interests (see also Ahmad & Brosio, 2011). Besley and 
Case (1995) introduce the concept of “yardstick competition” in which 
voters evaluate the performance of their local government in relation to the 
results achieved in neighboring jurisdictions. Given increasing mobility 
and information flows, the yardstick competition idea has recently been 
extended to relate to countries, as citizens in one country examine what 
results are achieved in other countries with which they are familiar 
(Salmon, 2010; Besely & Case, 1995). 
The building blocks of both the normative and positive traditions 
are similar—spending and taxation assignments, design of transfers, debt 
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management, and information flows and instruments for implementation. 
However, the sequencing and mix of these instruments can vary, as we 
discuss below. 
2.2. Decentralization Trends 
The impetus to decentralize has differed in many cases. In Latin 
America, the shift from one-party or military rule has led to a resurgence of 
interest in decentralization as a means of consolidating political gains, 
whereas China—a large, one-party, unitary state—has actually been quite 
decentralized. The cross-country push to decentralize, supported by 
international agencies, is in line with the normative approach to 
decentralization on the grounds that it would lead to better service delivery 
and poverty reduction. However, the evidence on this is at best mixed (see 
Ahmad, Brosio, & Tanzi, 2008, for a discussion on the evidence in OECD 
countries). Table 1 gives some trends from Ahmad and Brosio (2009). 
As in Pakistan, many Latin American countries have experienced 
some movement toward decentralization over the last two decades, often 
as a reaction to periods of one-party or military rule. This has been more 
marked on the spending side than on the revenue side. With respect to the 
latter, the trend has taken the opposite direction: countries have established 
more or less centralized systems for implementing value-added tax 
(VAT)—sometimes with the help of international agencies and particularly 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—often replacing myriad 
subnational taxes at the state and local levels. 
Table 1: Main traits of recent intergovernmental reforms in selected 
countries 
Country Main characteristics of 
intergovernmental relations 
Comments 
Australia Federal system Center administers VAT on behalf 
of states; reforms introduced in 
early 2000s. 
Belgium Federalization based on linguistic 
divisions 
Transformed from unitary to federal 
state 
Bolivia Three-layered unitary system Municipalities’ powers considerably 
increased. Election of governors of 
departments, some demanding 
substantial but asymmetrical 
powers—associated with natural 
resources. 
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Country Main characteristics of 
intergovernmental relations 
Comments 
Brazil Federal system based on three layers of 
government 
National reform and coordination of 
VAT is an urgent priority, although 
proposals for reform since the late 
1990s have not been acted on. 
Canada Federal system Asymmetric federation (special 
treatment for Quebec) 
China Highly decentralized system within 
a unitary constitution; operates like a 
quasi-federation 
Taxing power recentralized (1994) 
Colombia Three-layered unitary system Extensive devolution of resources to 
provinces (departments); movement 
toward a quasi-federation. 
Denmark Unitary system with strong 
municipal governments 
Recentralization of higher education 
and health since 2006 
France Regional system Regulatory, fiscal, and political 
decentralization initiated 
Germany Federal system with extended 
concurrent responsibilities 
Reforms to the federal structure 
initiated in a wide-ranging set of 
issues, but little change effected as a 
result of two commissions. 
Indonesia Unitary state Extensive decentralization of 
spending powers to district-level 
administrations after the fall of the 
Suharto administration, 
accompanied by a new revenue-
sharing arrangement. 
Italy Unitary, with asymmetric 
arrangements 
Fiscal, regulatory, and political 
decentralization initiated with a 
new constitution 
Mexico Federal system with high political 
and low fiscal decentralization 
Fiscal and regulatory 
decentralization since late 1980s, 
with basic education (1992) and 
healthcare (1996) devolved to states, 
although revenues have been 
effectively centralized since early 
1980s. 
Pakistan Federal constitution with interludes 
of military rule 
Deconcentration to districts in the 
early 2000s by Musharraf. 
Overlapping responsibilities on the 
spending side unwound with the 18th 
Amendment—most spending 
powers fully assigned to provinces. 
Relatively little subnational reliance 
on own-source revenues. 
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Country Main characteristics of 
intergovernmental relations 
Comments 
Peru Unitary state—moving toward a 
quasi-federation? 
Election of governors of regions—
sharing of natural resource 
revenues. Overlapping 
responsibilities with relatively 
limited spending or revenue 
devolution. 
Poland Unitary Political and fiscal decentralization 
with emphasis on the local level 
South Africa Post-Apartheid constitution 
introduced a quasi-federal system 
Devolution of extensive 
responsibilities for education and 
health to provinces 
Spain Regional, quasi-federal system Transition toward a federal system. 
Fiscal equalization with own-source 
revenues at subnational level. 
Asymmetric assignments for some 
regions. 
Switzerland Federal system Equalization transfers from 
federation to cantons 
UK Regional Introduction of regional 
government in Scotland and Wales 
Source: Ahmad and Brosio (2009). 
Despite the rhetoric, the approach on the spending side—
particularly in the Latin American countries—has entailed mixed and 
overlapping responsibilities that have not been adequately addressed. This 
partly reflects the centralized tendencies of the past together with a 
paternalistic approach, including by donors who do not trust subnational 
governments to make the right choices for their citizens in their area of 
competence (including education and social policy in general), or who feel 
that the lower levels lack the capability to manage their affairs effectively. 
The evidence on the effects of decentralization regarding 
improvements in service delivery in the OECD countries is mixed (see 
Ahmad et al., 2008). The evidence for developing countries is not much 
more conclusive (see Ahmad & Brosio, 2009). The links between 
decentralization and preference matching and with growth are often 
examined together. The studies confirm that any relationship, if it can be 
established, is at best weak and tenuous. 
Perhaps the greatest lacuna in the decentralization processes of 
developing countries is their lack of attention to adequate own-source 
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revenues at the subnational level. This may be due to the normative 
approaches that suggest focusing first on the spending side, especially at 
the intermediate tier of government/states/provinces/departments. 
2.3. Political Economy in Action: China 
In the 1990s Chinese context of murky spending responsibilities—
where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at different levels of government 
carried out a lot of social spending—in a legal unitary state with no central 
tax collection other than customs, the center had very limited ability to levy 
taxes. Economic reforms in the 1980s had moved from a system of 100 
percent profits taxation targeting largely SOEs (collected by local 
governments on behalf of the center) to a more moderate level of taxation. 
However, this caused the tax-to-GDP ratio to fall from more than 22 
percent to about 12 percent by 1993; more alarmingly, the central 
government’s share of collection fell from just under 60 percent in the early 
1980s to under 30 percent by 1993. This severely constrained the center 
from pursuing macroeconomic and redistributive policy goals. 
The debate at the time was whether the normative model of federal 
reforms should be followed, i.e., to clarify spending responsibilities and 
then adjust tax assignments accordingly—the “big bang” model also being 
used in Russia. Alternative approaches supported the Chinese 
administration’s view that it would be preferable to bolster central finances 
by establishing a state administration of taxation (for the first time in 
Chinese history) responsible for collecting modern taxes, particularly VAT 
(see Ahmad, Gao, & Tanzi, 1995). This view was accepted by the 
leadership, which was keen to avoid the difficulties that were apparent by 
then in Russia, following the collapse of the Soviet Union—another 
example of international yardstick competition. 
The new tax-sharing system with a central administration operated 
from 1994, and spending assignments were to be addressed over time as 
the SOEs were gradually reformed.3 The VAT reforms in particular were 
spectacularly successful, raising the central government’s share 
immediately and helping to bring the tax-to-GDP ratio up toward 20 
percent of GDP (see Figure 1). The interests of the local governments in the 
                                                     
3 See also Ahmad, Li, and Richardson (2002); Ahmad, Lee, and Kennedy (1993); Ahmad et al., 
(1995); Ahmad, Craig, and Mihaljek (1994); Ahmad, Craig, and Searle (1994); Ahmad (1997); Lou 
(1997); and Ahmad, Brixi, Fortuna, Lockwood, and Singh (2003). 
 Ehtisham Ahmad 
10 
 
 
tax reforms were protected by a “stop-loss” provision that ensured that all 
local governments would get the amounts they had received in 1993 and 
the new system would be phased in. All local governments shared 
incrementally as the new taxes were implemented (rich regions benefitted 
concomitantly). Political economy concerns were protected by an 
equalization system together with a Chinese innovation—“revenue 
returns”. 
Figure 1: China: Total tax revenue, local government revenue, and 
central government share of total revenue, 1985–2011 
 
Source: Ahmad, Rydge, and Stern (2013);   
A new equalization transfer system was established similar to the 
most advanced in the world (Ahmad et al., 1994; Ahmad, 1997, 2012) but its 
operations were phased in over time. In the short run, a “revenue 
returned” system was constituted that “returned” resources to the regions 
generating them (over and above) the revenue-sharing arrangement. While 
this was criticized as increasing inequality, in reality it was an essential 
component of “protecting” overall growth and investment. With the 
freeing up of the labor market (there were now 150 million migrants 
working in the coastal areas), it was essential to ensure full employment 
and reduce poverty (Lou, 1997). This is again an example of a pragmatic 
“positive” action to meet the specific circumstances of a country in rapid 
transition, for which the normative models are of limited utility. 
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Reforms of the budget, treasury, and reporting systems were also 
set in motion in the late 1990s in a sequence of measures to prepare for the 
operations of a modern economy. A second phase of the reforms is now 
needed to clarify spending responsibilities at the lower levels of 
government, and also to examine own-source revenues and debt in a way 
that optimizes land and local resource use. 
The Chinese reforms of 1993/94 are an excellent example of the 
positive approach to intergovernmental issues in action, and the 
importance of a new tax administration as well as a nondistortive tax, such 
as VAT. There was no concern that VAT would either affect the poor or 
hurt investment or growth. In fact, the form of VAT that was in operation 
for the first 15 years after implementation was the “investment” type that 
does not provide credits or refunds for capital purchases. This did not, 
however, seem to affect either investment or growth, which were 
spectacularly high during this period. The move to a more normal 
consumption-type VAT was initiated only recently as the need for 
efficiency became more pressing and the scope for raising revenues 
efficiently to around 25 percent of GDP became more difficult. 
3. Preconditions for Good Governance 
3.1. Overall Strategy for Sustainability 
Normative approaches to fiscal federalism emphasize the 
sequencing in which “finance follows function.” There is considerable 
validity in this proposition, especially when marginal changes are 
envisaged. This “recommendation” is designed to avoid an unsustainable 
expansion in overall spending and with a view to maintaining 
macroeconomic stability. It is also an argument that countries should begin 
decentralization reforms by starting with a devolution process on the 
spending side first, followed by the reassignment of revenues.  
The problems occur when finance does not follow function or when 
it encourages access to irresponsible financing mechanisms, such as 
borrowing without controls or accountability, or running up arrears. In 
such cases, a macroeconomic crisis is likely because local governments 
have every incentive to borrow and pass the buck to others. It is usually the 
central government that has to pick up the pieces, as in Latin America in 
the 1990s. In other countries, such as Nigeria, the absence of adequate local 
own-source revenues has meant that there was no incentive for local 
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governments to pay teachers under the devolution stipulated by the new 
constitution, and the functions had to be moved up to a higher level. 
Additionally, under certain political economy circumstances, as in 
China in the early 1990s, it may make sense to start with the revenue side 
first to ensure that there are adequate overall revenues to match the 
spending needs of general government, i.e., of the central and subcentral 
governments and associated public sector undertakings. The 1994 reforms 
that facilitated substantially decentralized spending over the following two 
decades were predicated on an effort to consolidate central revenues, 
including though VAT, accompanied by automatic redistribution 
mechanisms such as revenue sharing, equalization, and revenue returns, 
all of which served different purposes. Thus, a careful redesign of the 
transfer system is critical if a major structural reform on the revenue side is 
to be attempted in a multilevel or federal country. 
It is generally accepted that, in order to meet the Millenium 
Development Goal (MGD) objectives, a tax-to-GDP ratio of around 18 
percent is necessary for all levels of government or general government 
(Ahmad, 2013). India and China have worked very hard to increase their 
tax-to-GDP ratios to around 20 percent of GDP, but given their substantive 
investment needs in education and physical infrastructure, and for a more 
environmentally friendly growth strategy, a tax-to-GDP ratio in the range 
of 25 percent is more likely required (see estimate for India in Figure 2; 
IMF, 2013). 
Figure 2: General government revenue and GDP per capita, 2012 
 
Note: The figure excludes oil exporters and microstates. 
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Source: International Monetary Fund (World economic outlook 2013). 
Pakistan’s tax-to-GDP ratio was 14.5 percent in the early 1980s, and 
had declined to 10 percent by 2008 at the onset of the macroeconomic crisis 
that led to a mega-loan from the IMF. This was predicated on fixing the tax 
system, especially the moth-eaten general sales tax (GST) replete with 
exemptions and “holes” for 65-year-old infant industries (to use a turn of 
phrase popularized by a prominent Pakistani economist, Dr Nadeem Ul 
Haque) and for friends and relatives of those in power. The tax reforms 
failed, leading to the suspension of the IMF program in 2011.  
As the tax-to-GDP ratio slid below 9 percent in 2009, Haque (2009) 
correctly pointed to the dangers of Pakistan becoming a failed stated. This 
level of tax effort barely finances debt servicing and defense, and leaves 
precious little for public services or investment at any level of government. 
Under these circumstances, a major structural shift involving a significant 
decentralization of spending to the provincial governments—unbundling 
the parallel responsibilities of government—is of little more consequence 
than shifting deck chairs on the Titanic. 
3.2. Spending Assignments  
A useful typology of spending responsibilities showing how 
different countries approach these issues is given in Figure 3. It addresses 
the subsidiarity principle, which states that assignments should be 
devolved to the lowest level capable of effectively providing them. This is a 
general principle of the EU’s legal framework, constraining the 
supranational level from legislation to areas where action at the national, 
regional, or local levels is insufficient (see “Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty”, 2002).  
The concept has both legal and political ramifications. The focus is 
on scale as well as effects, including externalities, on other jurisdictions; 
this has given rise to actionable cases where there is a legal connotation, as 
in the EU.4 In political terms, the concept of subsidiarity is often taken 
beyond the multilevel government connotation to include the boundaries 
between the private sector and the role of the state (at any level). The 
assumption, especially by conservative commentators in the US, is that the 
                                                     
4 An interesting example is the European Court of Justice’s rejection of a case brought by the 
German government against the EU Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (Case C-233/94). 
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private sector should be encouraged to provide public services as far as 
possible because this is expected to be more efficient than public provision.  
Figure 3 shows the differing trends regarding the 
centralization/decentralization debate in different countries or regions. 
Arguments for the decentralization of functions are based largely on 
accountability and effective provision, given the subsidiarity principles. 
However, it is not enough to legislate the assignments—the lower levels 
have to have the capability as well as the incentive to provide services. 
Both are linked closely to the financing issue as well as incentives for 
effective provision. Thus, the argument that local governments lack 
“capacity” is not strictly binding if they have the financial resources to hire 
skilled workers. 
Figure 3: Modified subsidiarity principles 
 
Source: Adapted from Dafflon (2006). 
An important hypothesis governing accountability comes through 
the electoral process when voters are able to assess the performance of their 
“elected” rulers in relation to standards in neighboring jurisdictions (see 
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Salmon 1987, 2006; Besley & Case, 1995).5 Again, the incentives are critical 
and voters are more likely to be responsive if, at the margin, local 
governments rely on own-source revenues over which they control rates or 
bases.6 
Offsetting the decentralization trends are concerns that limit 
subsidiarity—mainly externalities such as spillovers (including those with 
environmental considerations), congestion, and economies of scale. 
Moreover, decentralization, especially of resource bases, can exacerbate 
inequalities across regions and limit the extent of interpersonal 
redistribution that might be feasible. In all cases, the federal, central, or 
supranational agencies have a role to play in coordinating and 
harmonizing essential policies.  
The US and certain other federations maintain a unified economic 
space facilitated by a “commerce clause.” In the EU, the common external 
tariff and harmonization of country-level VATs (see the EU Sixth Directive) 
ensure a common economic space to minimize harmful competition. Thus, 
a combination of legal and regulatory frameworks is essential to ensure 
equal treatment and opportunity. Again, for this to work efficiently, full 
information is needed on who spends what and on the buildup of assets 
and liabilities; as the recent EU experience illustrates, inadequate attention 
to the standardized flow of information could jeopardize a common 
economic space. 
3.3. Full Information on Transactions, Including the Uses and Flow of 
Funds  
A key element in accountable governance is timely information on 
the sources and uses of funds at all levels of government. This is critical for 
establishing benchmarks against which the performance of governments—
federal, provincial, and district—should be evaluated. Typically, it involves 
using the IMF’s (2001) government financial statistics (GFS) manual 
standards for economic classification (wages, social contributions, interest, 
operations and maintenance, etc.), and the UN’s Classification of Functions 
of Government (COFOG) for education, health, and other functions. This 
                                                     
5 A recent extension by Salmon posits that cross-country comparisons may be even more important 
for voters. 
6 See Ambrosiano and Bordignon (2006) for a discussion on the general issues, and Gadenne 
(2012) for an interesting assessment based on the case of Rio de Janeiro.  
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should provide an indication of what revenues were generated, what was 
budgeted, and what was spent. In principle, this information for Pakistan 
should have been generated by the Project to Improve Financial Reporting 
and Auditing (PIFRA) project, which has been implemented over ten years 
at a cost exceeding USD 100 million (under a World Bank loan).  
Most governments provide economic and functional data for each 
level of administration to the IMF’s GFS yearbook. Pakistan’s GFS page for 
the most recent yearbook only covers information on the budgetary central 
government. Given that most spending is at the subnational level or is 
carried out by agencies associated with the central government, the data in 
the GFS yearbook is less than useless for policy purposes. With declining 
outcomes in education and healthcare—where Pakistan is now falling 
behind sub-Saharan Africa—and donors’ focus on the social sectors, the 
absence of readily available information7 in these critical areas is a serious 
problem. This ensures that the electorates of the districts and provinces, 
indeed of the country as a whole, are comparatively uninformed about 
relative spending by the public sector in areas of key policy importance. 
In addition to the financial information on public spending that 
forms the basis for evaluating governments at election time, it is important 
to have information on the outcomes of spending by the public sector. 
Again, this is a critical element in the operation of “yardstick competition” 
and in the operation of the electoral process to discipline governments. 
The cash-basis of the budget process in Pakistan also poses 
problems: it permits “game-play” by the respective governments in terms 
of pushing liabilities into the future and bringing forward credits, e.g., the 
securitization of revenues or asset sales that inflate short-term revenues. A 
typical mechanism for hiding liabilities is to shift them on to SOEs. 
Astonishingly, in the early 1990s the IMF agreed to ignore the liabilities 
being generated in the SOEs (see Ahmad & Mohammed, 2013). This would 
not be appropriate under the IMF’s (2001) GFS manual framework and 
may have contributed to the buildup of circular debt in the country. 
Public-private-partnerships (PPPs) are an increasingly convenient 
vehicle for “kicking the can of responsibility” down the road. This is true of 
                                                     
7 For example, on the websites of the Ministry of Finance, the Federal Bureau of Statistics, or the 
State Bank of Pakistan. 
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developing and developed countries alike and contributed significantly to 
the fiscal problem in the EU. It has led to tighter accounting rules, 
especially the recognition of “public” liabilities in PPPs. Consequently, the 
accounting rules regarding PPPs were also tightened, leading to a need for 
provisioning to prevent mechanisms to circumvent liabilities. 
For full accountability, it is not sufficient to be able to track and 
report on budgeted amounts, eventually also focusing on the results of the 
spending. Equally important is tracking government cash. Typically, 
countries maintain treasury single accounts (TSAs) into which all public 
funds flow and from which all spending is authorized. Although in certain 
cases, commercial bank accounts may be needed to facilitate payments or 
receive revenues, these should not contain balances. These zero-balance 
accounts are linked with the TSA for overnight deposit of revenues or the 
reimbursement of authorized payments.  
At the time the government was considering an IMF program in 
spring 2008, Finance Minister Dar asked for the government balance sheet 
to be drawn up. This indicated government balances of around USD 10 
billion in commercial bank accounts at low or zero interest. Although the 
IMF’s 2008 program had a provision for the establishment of a TSA, this 
has not happened—both military and political governments are disinclined 
to be subject to the discipline and transparency of a TSA. As for the banks, 
they are quite happy to lend the same money back to the government as 
the deficit increases and is financed by bank borrowing. 
With this opaque system, it is hard to impose accountability at any 
level of government. There is no information on what should be spent, is 
actually spent, or what is happening to public funds. Yardstick competition 
is impossible with a poor governance structure. As important as the tax 
reform has been in China, the establishment of a GFS 2001-compliant 
budget framework, and of TSAs at the central and provincial levels, has 
been equally important in instituting an effective system of decentralized 
investment and governance. 
3.4. Own-Source Revenues, Transfers, and Access to Credit  
A critical part of the story of accountable governance at the 
subnational level concerns “own-source” revenues. This relates to the 
ability of a lower-level government to raise revenues by varying the rate of 
a reasonable tax base. Thus, in North America, state and local governments 
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are able to set the rates of state or local income taxes using the federal tax 
base. This ensures that additional revenues can be generated in case of 
need. There need not be a state or local tax administration, and the federal 
tax administration could be used to do the “heavy lifting” in relation to IT, 
cross-referencing information, and audits. It can be thought of as a “piggy 
back” or co-occupancy of a tax base, in case there are parallel 
administrations.  
Note that shared revenues are not strictly own-source revenues and 
are closer to transfers, since subnational governments can do little to 
influence the rate or base and are merely recipients of the revenues. 
Additionally, taxes administered by the central tax administration can be 
considered own-source if the local government is able to vary the rate. 
Analogously, if it is difficult to vary the rate of a subnational tax base (such 
as the GST on services), that tax base is not an effective “own-source” 
revenue. 
Without an effective own-source revenue handle, it is not possible 
to hold a subnational government responsible for its debt or buildup of 
liabilities (Ambrosiano & Bordignon, 2006). This would weaken hard 
budget constraints, if any, and reduce local accountability. One of the 
biggest macroeconomic problems in Latin America during the 1990s was 
countries’ uncontrolled subnational borrowing, often from their own 
banks. Following the Brazilian lead in the late 1990s, many countries have 
constituted fiscal responsibility legislation at the subnational level. This too 
can, however, be oversold—such legislation is only as good as the systems 
to monitor and report on the buildup of liabilities. Moreover, hard budget 
constraints are critical and require, in turn, effective own-source revenues. 
Even if a country has an assigned own-source revenue handle, 
lower levels of government may have little incentive to use it if they have 
access to badly designed transfers or credit for which the liability can be 
shifted to others. Thus, if central transfers are a function of actual deficits at 
lower levels (called “fiscal dentistry” in India; see Rao, 1998), they will have 
no incentive to use own-source revenues or spend efficiently. 
It is thus clear from theory and practice that good governance at the 
subnational level is a complex set of policy measures where interaction 
matters in terms of generating appropriate incentives for accountability. It 
is likely that isolated reforms, such as for spending assignments in 
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isolation, may not work as anticipated and might even make matters 
worse. 
4. Challenges for Pakistan: Stalled Reform Agenda 
Although Pakistan has always been a federal country, extensive 
periods of military rule have led to perceptions of dominance by the center, 
despite attempts to “decentralize”. In the 1960s, Field Marshal Ayub 
Khan’s administration experimented with a system of “basic 
democracies”—setting up an electoral college at the local level that also 
formed the basis of development activities in their regions. This effort at 
political “deconcentration” was abolished under the 1973 Constitution, 
which restored the rights and functions of the provinces—the main 
subnational unit of governance under the Government of India Act 1935 
(the basis for both India and Pakistan’s constitutions after independence). 
General Musharraf’s administration also promoted a form of so-
called “decentralization” in the post-9/11 period. While it was ostensibly a 
mechanism to move services closer to the people and elected local officials, 
there was little attempt to adjust spending assignments or financing 
arrangements. Although the process was clearly an attempt to bypass the 
established political parties and power centers in the provinces, bilateral 
donors and multilateral banks rushed to support the process along with the 
Federal Board of Revenue (FBR)’s institutional reforms and government 
financial information systems at all levels of government. Each of these 
reforms had failed or was in significant difficulty by the time Musharraf 
left office in 2008 (see Ahmad & Mohammed, 2013). 
The impetus for the 18th Amendment was primarily a reaction 
against a decade of military rule. It also came at a period of economic 
distress, after food and oil price shocks had severely affected the stability of 
an economy that had relied on capital inflows to generate growth and 
neglected domestic resource mobilization. The government’s approach to 
the IMF in 2008 was predicated on tax reforms—principally fixing the holes 
in the GST. At the same time, the NFC met to work on the 2010–14 award, 
keeping in view the provinces’ deplorable levels of spending on the social 
sectors, principally education and healthcare. The Finance Division’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) envisaged significant progress 
toward meeting the MDGs, for which additional resources were to have 
been allocated to the provinces. We argue that all three sets of reforms 
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were closely intertwined, and that the failure of the tax reforms has 
seriously jeopardized both the NFC award and the 18th Amendment. 
4.1. Tax Reforms 
The reform of the tax administration has been recognized as a 
priority since the early 1980s and the report of the Tax Reforms 
Commission headed by Qamar-ul Islam, which had called the then Central 
Board of Revenue a hotbed of corruption and rent seeking. A GST was 
introduced in 1990 under an IMF-supported program (but brought in 
through the back door, when the entire sales tax act was replaced as part of 
the finance bill). It was administered very arbitrarily, with the tax 
administration treating it like a production excise (Ahmad, 2010b), setting 
reference prices and continuing to give exemptions and preferences 
through a system of administrative orders (SROs) that provided ample 
opportunity for the rent-seeking and corrupt practices to continue. The 
ability to give preferences and exemptions and reward specific groups, 
while threatening to punish others without reference to Parliament, 
provided convenient handles to politicians of successive weak 
administrations to make friends and influence people. 
At the end of the 1990s, a committee led by former World Bank 
official Shahid Husain recommended the creation of an integrated revenue 
administration, using the modern principles of self-assessment, an arm’s-
length functional administration with minimal contact with taxpayers, and 
consequently limited opportunities for rent seeking. This was supported by 
a large World Bank loan to create the new FBR on the Argentine Revenue 
Authority model.  
By the spring of 2008, the World Bank had classified the project as 
“unsatisfactory”. A functional organization structure had not been created 
and an IT system was prepared in-house that largely automated the old 
procedures. Additionally, key productive structures had been removed 
from the GST net with domestic zero-rating, largely to offset delays in 
refunds and ease pressure on these sectors from an overvalued exchange 
rate in a manner that would not attract the World Trade Organization’s 
attention. In order to appear “investor-friendly”, the audit system had been 
effectively abandoned in 2004/05. It is no wonder that the GST failed to 
raise revenues, as had been expected under the strategy to replace tariffs by 
the GST (the plan had been to replicate the Singapore strategy that had 
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very effectively used this method). An attempt to revive the project under 
the IMF’s 2008 program also failed, as discussed below. 
By 2009, the GST’s efficiency in Pakistan had fallen to around 0.26 
(as measured by the C-efficiency ratio; see Ahmad, 2010b, for more details), 
and collection had declined to 3.1 percent of GDP from 3.9 percent in the 
1990s (see Table 2). If Pakistan were to achieve the C-efficiency of Sri Lanka 
(from around 2004 at the height of the civil war), it would more than 
double the collection or reach around 7 percent of GDP with a 15 percent 
rate. It is worth noting that the taxation of goods and services in China 
generates around 9 percent of GDP (Ahmad, Ryder, & Stern, 2013). 
Table 2: GST productivity—declining and low in comparison with 
competitors 
Country  Standard rate Revenue/GDP Productivity 
Pakistan (1990s) 15  0.39 
Pakistan (2005) 15 3.4 0.30 
Pakistan (2009) 16 3.1 0.26 
Sri Lanka  15 6.7 0.47 
Philippines  12 4.3 0.45 
Turkey  18 7.1 0.48 
Lebanon  10 5.1 0.50 
Jordan  16 10.1 0.62 
Korea  10 6.7 0.67 
Singapore  5 1.8 0.63 
New Zealand  12.5 8.9 0.93 
Source: International Monetary Fund, various country papers. 
4.2. The Stabilization Program 
The economic crisis of 2007/08 led to a significant rise in the budget 
deficit and overall debts—leading to a hemorrhaging of record high 
reserves. A government stabilization plan in September 2008 was based on 
raising the tax-to-GDP ratio by five percentage points, and its key element 
was the reform of the VAT that formed the basis of the submission to the 
IMF. The argument was that the government needed roughly two years to 
revive and implement the Shahid Husain plan to restructure the FBR, and 
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that the IMF monies would be a “bridging loan” while this reform took 
effect. 8 
The revised VAT law was meant to remove distortions in the 
GST—especially the domestic zero-rating and exemptions that were largely 
designed to benefit special interest groups and, pari passu, consumers of 
luxury textiles and oriental carpets. The other main objective had been to 
create the basis for an arm’s-length tax administration based on self-
assessment and effective audit, minimizing the problems of direct contact 
between the tax administration and taxpayers and also the difficulties with 
the issue of refunds, which had created considerable rent seeking. A critical 
additional objective was to remove the tax administration’s ability to confer 
benefits on the chosen few through the notorious SRO system; the new law 
required any such change to be submitted to Parliament and that the FBR 
would be stripped of this power. 
The “streamlined” VAT law would also have replaced multiple 
rates (from 17 to 26 percent) and the cascading associated with reference 
prices by a single rate and considerable simplicity, including the 
elimination of SROs, but it was badly sold to the public and to Parliament. 
This was partly due to opposition from the vested interest groups that had 
benefitted from the holes in the GST, and partly due to the tax 
administration’s reluctance to relinquish its “rent-seeking powers” and the 
loss of the SRO handles. Although the Senate passed a corrupted version of 
the VAT bill (retaining some draconian powers for the FBR), there was 
enough opposition to the bill in the lower house to stall it on the absurd 
grounds that it would “crush the poor”, without empirical or analytical 
support. In reality, the poor would have been largely unaffected by the 
GST, but will surely be crushed by the resort to deficit financing and 
borrowing from the banking system. 
In order to “rescue the IMF program”, the government proposed a 
Plan B in March 2011 to remove the main “exemptions” under the GST, but 
without the full overhaul of the law. This was to remove by administrative 
                                                     
8 The former head of the Argentine Revenue Authority was hired by the World Bank to prepare a 
plan to enable a reformed VAT to be implemented in a reformed FBR by summer 2010—the key 
date under the IMF program (Silvani, Biber, Crandall, Grant, Reos, & Seymour, 2008). By 2011, 
this effort had been abandoned. The original USD 135 million loan was not fully drawn. The World 
Bank now plans to revive the project with a USD 300 million loan. The problems lay in the 
incentive structures facing officials and politicians and not the financing constraints. 
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order the SROs that had led to the exemptions. This option faced no legal 
difficulty. It would not have raised much additional revenue and may even 
have led to less revenue in the short run, but it would clearly indicate that 
the authorities intended to tackle vested interests seriously. The reform 
lasted less than a fortnight as the vested interests coalesced, and the 
proposals were replaced with a far worse situation with the SRO283, issued 
on 1 April 2011. 
SRO283 provided all sorts of exemptions and lower rates on all 
manner of final and intermediate goods—184 items in all—and recreated 
the “cascading” that is the antithesis of a GST. Finally, item 185 stipulated 
that any other exemptions that might be needed in the future would be 
included without having to issue an additional SRO—this is SRO making 
ad absurdum. More problematic is that the FBR has effectively abandoned 
the logic of the arm’s-length administration that was the basis of the Shahid 
Husain proposal. Indeed, the use of third-party information from the 
National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) is being accessed 
and selectively used. Without adequate safeguards, there will be enhanced 
scope for reinvigorated rent-seeking in an administration reliant on the 
SRO culture. It is extremely dangerous to leave tax making powers in the 
hands of an unaccountable tax administration, and it negates the basis of a 
parliamentary system. 
The SRO powers also reduce the trust of the federating provinces in 
the FBR since they effectively reduce the overall revenues that should 
accrue to the provinces through the divisible pool. This is also the subject 
matter of the NFC, which we address next. 
4.3. The 7th NFC Award 
The provinces have long been responsible for the bulk of spending 
on health and education. Given long-standing budgetary constraints, 
however, this spending has fallen far short of what is considered necessary 
to meet minimum standards, let alone the MDGs—indeed, outcomes in 
both sectors have fallen behind all other South Asian countries. Total 
spending on health and education in 2007/08 was 5.4 percent of GDP, 
which the PRSP aimed to increase to 6.8 percent of GDP by 2011 (Pakistan, 
Finance Division, 2010, p. 331). The main vehicle for this was an increase in 
the provinces’ share of the divisible pool, given that they did not have 
adequate own-revenue sources. 
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The calculation made by the finance minister at the time was that, 
with the proposed tax reforms, an increasing total pie would leave 
sufficient resources in the hands of the center even as the provincial share 
was increased from under 47 percent in 2008/09 to 56 percent in 2010/11 
and 57.5 percent thereafter. The logic was understandable, even as Pasha, 
Pasha, and Imran (2010) warned that the projections might be optimistic. 
As it happens, the collapse of the 2008 tax reform proposals, taken 
by the government to the Friends of Democratic Pakistan and then to the 
IMF, proved to be calamitous for the NFC award. First, it opened up a gap 
almost immediately between the provinces’ expected and actual revenue-
sharing transfers—from 1.3 percent of GDP in 2010/11 to 2.9 percent by 
2013 (Table 3). This gap is in relation to the spending assignments that 
were in place in 2009, and does not factor in the 18th Amendment (which 
we discuss in the next section). 
Table 3: NFC projections 2010–14 (percentage of GDP) 
Item 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
Divisible pool (actuals) 3.8 4.8     
Total provincial resources 4.56 6.2     
Federal tax collections 
projected by NFC 
10 11 12 13 14 15 
NFC provincial shares 
expected 
 6.16 6.90 7.48 8.05 8.63 
Tax collections (actual) 
2010/11 
 8.7 8.5 8.5 9.0 10.1 
Revised NFC divisible pool  4.87 4.89 4.89 5.18 5.81 
Provincial funding gap  -1.29 -2.01 -2.59 -2.88 -2.82 
Education and health (PRSP 
II) 
 6.79     
Source: Government of Pakistan (2010); and author’s own calculations. 
The second difficulty was that the failure of the tax reforms left far 
too little in the hands of the federal government. Thus, for 2010/11, the 
share of the divisible pool in the hands of the federation was around 4 
percent of GDP. Debt servicing alone was 5.6 percent of GDP in the same 
year (IMF, 2011). 
It had been clear that the reforms promised under the 2008 IMF 
program involved an integrated GST, building on the Musharraf 
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government’s arrangement to ensure a common administration but 
removing the exemptions and zero-ratings that had been introduced by the 
previous regime. At the time the NFC award was being finalized, a 
Ministry of Finance team had worked on drafting a revised GST/VAT law 
that was to be presented to Parliament by end-December 2009. Yet the NFC 
award finalized in December 2009 reiterated that the GST on services was a 
provincial subject and that collection could also be provincial. Although 
there was an attempt to paper over the gaping cracks and ensure that the 
FBR would continue to administer those services that entered inter-
industry transactions, affecting cross-provincial ones—especially banking 
and insurance, telecommunications, and trade-related services—the 
proposals did not stick and the whole structure collapsed. 
The failure of the tax reforms implies that there is no conceivable 
way of reaching the 15 percent of GDP target for the overall tax-to-GDP 
ratio by 2014/15; the budget strategy paper issued in 2012 brought the 
target down to 10.1 percent of GDP. This is catastrophic for the federal 
government since the increasing cost of borrowing alone will far exceed the 
federation’s share of the post-7th NFC divisible pool. This can only hasten 
the collapse of the federal government forecast by Haque (2009). 
Unfortunately, the situation in the provinces is no better. As 
mentioned above, a shrinking resource pie relative to expectations puts the 
pre-18th Amendment goals out of reach, e.g., as enunciated in the PRSP-II 
(see Pakistan, Finance Division, 2010). The 18th Amendment merely adds to 
the unfunded mandates, which can only lead to further erosion in public 
services and gaps vis-à-vis the MDGs. 
4.4. The 18th Amendment 
The devolution process that has begun with the 18th Amendment 
presents a great opportunity to change the way that public policy is 
formulated in Pakistan, and hopefully to make it more responsive to the 
needs and desires of the population. However, if the tax reforms do not 
succeed, given the vociferous opposition by the vested interests that have 
benefitted from exemptions and zero rating,9 the entire devolution process 
                                                     
9 This has been couched in “populist” terms as affecting the interests of the poor—in fact, a 
properly functioning tax system would reduce the government’s borrowing requirements and the 
current inflationary pressures. It is also unlikely that relative prices would change adversely for the 
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will run into trouble, as has the current NFC award. This seriously risks the 
implosion of the existing intergovernmental fiscal system. 
Shah (2012) provides a very comprehensive assessment of the 
benefits and challenges arising from the 18th Amendment. We focus here 
on the issue of unfunded mandates, which could lead to an implosion of 
public institutions and services, as well as the very real dangers posed by 
increasing barriers to interprovincial trade. Both are extremely damaging 
to the concept of an integrated federation, and we consider each in turn. 
4.5. Unfunded Mandates 
The unfunded mandates have been exacerbated by the new 
responsibilities added to the pre-18th Amendment spending assignments in 
relation to the assigned own-revenue bases and shared revenues and 
transfers. As discussed above, the provinces and local governments lacked 
the necessary resources, prior to the 18th Amendment, to effectively 
provide for their responsibilities at that time. Without the tax reforms, the 
NFC award is just a mirage in the desert. 
4.6. Subsidiarity and Spending Assignments 
The 18th Amendment eliminated the Constitution’s concurrent lists, 
giving provinces sole powers in a number of areas, including health and 
education. The speed at which the spending functions were devolved 
meant that inadequate attention was given to the role of “subsidiarity”, the 
role of regulations, and the coordination of functions with associated 
externalities, such as primary healthcare, university education, climate 
change and environment, and natural disasters.  
Almost immediately, the provinces discovered that they could not 
finance the very heavy expenditures that had been incurred by the Higher 
Education Commission, and made a reference to the Council of Common 
Interests to return the function to the federation. Unfortunately, financing 
for the function was no longer available, and the federation attempted to 
move the function under a line ministry rather than an independent 
commission, as had been the case prior to the 18th Amendment. Some 
commentators suspect that this might have been linked to the Higher 
                                                                                                                                    
poor with the removal of these extraordinary benefits for the pampered sectors and a downward 
revision and consolidation of the GST’s rate restructure. 
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Education Commission’s refusal to certify the questionable educational 
credentials or degrees of a large number of lawmakers (of all major 
parties). 
In other areas too, such as preventive healthcare and 
pharmaceutical standards, once a function with widespread externalities is 
dismantled and handed over to subnational governments, it is likely that 
there will be conflicting or confusing standards that could increase the 
likelihood of epidemics. If the provinces cannot handle the function, it is 
exceedingly difficult to reestablish the previous institutional arrangements 
at the national level, not to mention that the federation now has to borrow 
to meet its current expenditures and is caught in a debt trap. 
The 18th Amendment unwound the steps taken by the Musharraf 
government to constitute a third tier of government, passing virtually all 
powers to the provinces and leaving it to provincial assemblies to decide 
whether or not to devolve further. This reaction to a desirable reform by 
the military government (made, albeit, for the wrong reasons) is 
understandable, but not well thought out. The functions and operations of 
the third level of government should be clearly delineated, as well as the 
role of the federation in keeping with the subsidiarity principles outlined 
above. 
In addition, more work is needed to improve effective service 
delivery at the district or local levels, and to counter the possible 
inadequacy of local incentives in providing for the most vulnerable, e.g., 
the aged without extended family support, single women, and minorities. 
It is likely that the local or provincial government has less interest in 
providing services or protection to minorities, such as the Hazaras in 
Balochistan, who are nonetheless full citizens of the country and entitled to 
the same privileges and safety as any inhabitant of Islamabad or the 
exclusive neighborhoods of Karachi or Lahore. This could lead to 
significant miscarriages of justice and equity in the future; indeed, it is 
happening with alarming frequency—reminiscent of North’s10 warning of 
failure in the context of limited access states. 
The expectations raised by the 1973 Constitution bear no relation to 
what can be financed. It guarantees: 
                                                     
10 See North, Wallis and Weingast (2009). 
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• “Compulsory and free” education till secondary level [#37(b)]  
• “Access to technical and higher education for all on merit” [#37c]  
• The ”basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, housing, 
education and medical relief for all such citizens, as are permanently 
or temporarily unable to earn their livelihood on account of infirmity, 
sickness or unemployment” [#38d].  
The social benefits for the unemployed or incapacitated are very 
Bismarckian. The guarantees are very clear, with no additional targeting or 
score cards that are open to “capture” or “clientelism.” These are 
constitutional basic rights and actionable in court, but in order to finance 
these rights, a revenue-to-GDP ratio commensurate with the more 
advanced developing countries, such as Chile or Brazil, is needed—i.e., 25 
percent or more. This is also the goal that China is pursuing. However, it 
appears almost completely out of reach under the present configuration of 
policy and administration in Pakistan. 
4.7. Barriers to Trade and Integration 
On the spending side, as pointed out by Shah (2012), the absence of 
a national standard setting capability might be a severe constraint to 
establishing a common integrated market. On the revenue side, the sales 
tax on services, if applied at one of the few ports by the respective province 
without providing credit to purchasers in other provinces, could become 
an effective import duty on cross-provincial trade. This is a potential 
conflict with the commerce clause in the Constitution. 
4.8. Revenue Reassignments  
A fundamental problem lies in the absence of effective own-source 
revenues at the provincial or local levels. As seen in the Latin American 
and East Asian cases, this is the Achilles’ heel of the devolution process in 
many countries, leading to a loss of accountability and responsibility for 
local service delivery. A share in the divisible pool or the unstable 
assignment of the GST on services does not count as effective own-source 
revenues. 
In keeping with the Government of India Act 1935, Pakistan’s 
current constitution maintains the concept of split revenue bases, both for 
sales as well as incomes. This has opened up vast avenues for tax 
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avoidance and evasion—such as the abuse of the agricultural income 
exemption. Moreover, with the rent seeking in the FBR, there is little 
confidence in its ability to keep the provinces’ interests in mind in 
performing its functions. 
The 18th Amendment reiterates the right of the provinces to 
administer the GST on services, if they so desire—the revenues belong to 
them in any case. This makes it very difficult for a provincial government 
to vary the rate structures without making their GST almost impossible to 
implement for fear of it degenerating into an instrument for “provincial tax 
wars” or impediments to trade. There is also a danger with credit invoices 
issued by one province to be honored by others or the federation—this 
would be akin to the “invoice sightseeing” that has become a serious 
problem in Brazil, and would magnify the “flying” invoices that are 
already a serious problem with zero-rating in Pakistan’s case (and that is 
with a single administration). 
The split base of the GST relating to goods and services is unique to 
the Subcontinent, and has its origins in the Government of India Act 1935 
that assigned the sales tax on goods to the states/provinces. After 
independence, the goods part was taken over by the federal government in 
Pakistan, and the more difficult element on services was left to the 
jurisdiction of the provinces, reiterated in the 1973 Constitution. As there 
was no GST or VAT at that time, the complexity of this assignment was not 
realized. Thus, Pakistan finds itself in a unique position as being the only 
country in the world trying to implement a GST on services at the 
subnational level, without the administrative machinery to do so. Even if it 
had the administrative machinery, this would be a herculean task. 
A cooperative solution would have been to permit the FBR to 
function on behalf of the federation and the provinces (as had been 
initiated by the Musharraf administration) to collect an integrated GST for 
the federation and all the provinces, close loopholes, and deliver a larger 
pie to the provinces directly as well as through the common divisible pool. 
After all, this was the basis of the NFC award. However, one province 
rejected this arrangement, given the severe trust deficit associated with the 
FBR. A complex alternative mechanism was proposed to work around this 
difficulty, with the current FBR effectively operating the crediting and 
refund mechanisms associated with the GST—the only agency capable of 
doing so. But, as discussed above, vested interests opposed fixing the 
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loopholes in the GST and there is very little confidence in the current FBR’s 
ability to operate on an arm’s-length basis. 
By now it is clear that the current system underpinning the 18th 
Amendment is not sustainable. A more stable solution is needed that 
provides the provinces with significant tax handles that also generate 
greater accountability for subnational spending. Marginal changes to tax 
rates will not do. Also, as the post-NFC discussion on the GST illustrates, 
agreements are not easy to reach and are unstable. Ideally, a new 
arrangement should be sought and another constitutional arrangement on 
the revenue side introduced to preserve the thrust of the 18th Amendment 
and positive elements on the spending side. Both policy options and new 
administrative arrangements need to be examined—this is a significant 
research agenda that should also involve the next NFC award. 
It is not possible to initiate sensible reforms in the tax policy agenda 
without an arm’s-length tax administration that has the trust of the 
federating units. Similarly, such an administration cannot be conceived 
without overhauling the tax policy framework and the associated 
assignments to different levels of government. This is as complex a task as 
the 18th Amendment, but should be more carefully designed before being 
rushed through Parliament. However, there is nothing like an economic 
crisis to concentrate minds and create the political will to carry out serious 
reforms, so if there is the opportunity, it should be taken. Some of the lines 
of reform can be gleaned from the successes in China and the difficulties 
faced in other federations such as Brazil and India, who are also stuck with 
inefficient split bases and find it hard to overcome the vested interests that 
coalesce around the benefits conferred. 
4.9. Policy Options 
A fundamental principle guiding the tax policy agenda should be 
that the major tax bases should be consolidated, and that both the 
provinces and districts should be assigned tax handles that allow flexibility 
to set rates at the margin. This flexibility is the crux of own-source revenues 
and the foundation for accountability in both revenue generation and 
spending. 
At the national level, the major tax bases could be consolidated 
along the following lines: 
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• Income taxes. All sources of income are income and should be treated 
equally to avoid distortions, tax shelters, and handles for rent seeking 
and corruption. This implies that the following: 
• Personal income tax. All sources of income should be included in 
the tax base, including agriculture, property, and foreign source 
income. The provinces and districts should be allowed to 
“piggyback” on the full base; this will give them more revenues 
than at present and does not require separate administrations, just 
the setting of rates. 
• Corporate income tax (CIT). The holes and preferences should be 
closed, and the rate reduced to 25 percent, as in China and many 
other countries. A gross assets tax should be constituted in the 
short run to plug the gaps, and this should be creditable against 
CIT liability. The CIT could continue to go into the divisible pool. 
• GST. This should be treated as an integrated tax and administered as 
an arm’s-length agency. It should have a single rate and no 
exemptions other than on unprocessed food. The sharing 
arrangements could include the following:  
• Fully entering the divisible pool. This would allow 57.5 percent 
of the hopefully better-performing GST to go to the provinces, 
thereby fulfilling the objectives of the 7th NFC award. 
• Australian model. In Australia, the VAT is centrally collected but 
100 percent is returned to the states through an equalization 
system run by the Commonwealth Grants Commission on which 
the states are equally represented. This option closes both 
horizontal and vertical gaps and is compatible with maintaining 
incentives for subnational efficiency. If this model is chosen, the 
divisible pool could be scrapped since the personal income tax 
piggyback (and similar arrangements for the CIT as in the US) 
would provide for own-source revenues. 
• Sharing arrangements. This is the Chinese model, which gives 
rich provinces an opportunity to share in the country’s growing 
revenue generation. However, it needs to be accompanied by an 
equalization framework in order to provide incentives for the 
poorer provinces that do not generate revenues, given the lower 
volume of transactions. 
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• Carbon tax. This should replace the petroleum levy, as originally 
designed, and should also be shared with the provinces (see Ahmad 
& Stern, 2009).  
• Excises. Some excises could be established at the national level and 
feed into the divisible pool. Others could be purely provincial, 
provided they do not affect interprovincial commerce.  
• Property taxes. These should be assigned to the districts/municipal 
governments as far as rate setting is concerned, although the 
provinces could be responsible for the cadaster, land register, and 
valuation.  
• User charges and tolls. These should be largely local, although the 
old octroi should not be resurrected.  
The above options provide provinces with both additional revenues 
as well as own-source tax handles, without the need for separate 
administrations. In the Pakistan context, however, it would be necessary to 
establish an arm’s-length tax administration that was acceptable to the 
provinces. 
4.10. Administration 
The trust deficit vis-à-vis the FBR/Central Board of Revenue has 
only grown since the warnings of the Qamar-ul Islam Commission in the 
1980s. The failed attempt to implement the Shahid Husain report under the 
World Bank’s USD 135 million Tax Administration Reforms Project (TARP) 
highlights the incentive problems inherent in the current structure. The 
World Bank’s proposal to throw more money at the problem through the 
USD 300 million TARP II is likely to meet the same fate since neither the 
authorities or the donors recognize the incentive incompatibility of the 
existing arrangement, and the political economy difficulties in making the 
current model work.  
TARP and the rescue of TARP in 2009 could not reform the existing 
FBR to make it operate on an arm’s-length basis. With its ability to use 
NADRA data, the FBR has become truly intrusive and quite dangerous 
given that rent-seeking opportunities have been magnified out of all 
proportion. An FBR that can issue SROs at will, overriding tax laws 
without reference to Parliament and in the absence of any consultation 
with the provinces whose revenue shares are compromised, is a nonstarter 
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for the sort of tax administration that needs to underpin a new 
intergovernmental framework in Pakistan. 
It may be necessary to start on the tax administration afresh, with a 
completely new staff (as was the case in Peru in the early 1990s). The entity 
may need to be detached from the Ministry of Finance, with its own 
responsible and accountable minister (as in China), and placed under a 
board with representation from the provinces. As the Peruvian example 
shows, a new administration can be constructed quite quickly as long as 
the roles and modus operandi are clear from the outset. 
Given the implosion of public services and growing failures to keep 
minorities and other citizens secure, the intergovernmental and 
governance framework needs to be subject to urgent review and action. 
There is much to learn from China. Significant additional work is needed to 
recalibrate spending responsibilities and, particularly, to completely 
redesign the tax assignments and administration for the 18th Amendment 
to work effectively without unraveling the federation. 
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